It is a difficult time to write anything that is not about the ongoing war in Ukraine.
A couple of weeks ago I published an opinion text in Swedish where I argue that the massive trend toward boycotting all Russian actors and failing to sustain and build relationships with Russian society is both immoral and risks negative effects in the short and long term. This is the time for “girlcotting”, in other words actively supporting the good forces in Russia, rather than boycotting the bad.
One of my main points in the text is this:
To hope that the Russian people will get rid of Putin because we stop talking, cooperating and working with them is naive. Moreover, to hope that after a change of regime they will return to us without bitterness, when we rejected them during the greatest of crises, is disrespectful and foolish.
I am also shocked and at the same time not surprised at the censorship and disregard for liberal values that now accompany the military support and economic warfare. The willingness to censor Russian media in the West (including in Sweden), and with righteous zeal to argue that one defends democracy against apparently obvious sources of disinformation is quite hard to stomach. Especially when ironically done at the same time as one lambasts the Russian censorship against domestic and foreign media in Russia. That the freedom to publish news becomes a privilege afforded by governments is a further example of the growing trend of authoritarian liberalism.
But in the flood of material on the war I have consumed the last weeks, here are a few good ones I recommend:
A piece by the historian Niall Ferguson – “Putin Misunderstands History. So, Unfortunately, Does the U.S.” – that helpfully tries to put the war in a historical light (which all sides do, and which is of course intrinsically difficult). Ferguson’s view is that the US and the West plays a very dangerous game:
It would indeed be wonderful if the combination of attrition in Ukraine and a sanctions-induced financial crisis at home led to Putin’s downfall. Take that, China! Just you try the same trick with Taiwan — which, by the way, we care about a lot more than Ukraine because of all those amazing semiconductors they make at Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co.
The fascinating thing about this strategy is the way it combines cynicism and optimism. It is, when you come to think of it, archetypal Realpolitik to allow the carnage in Ukraine to continue; to sit back and watch the heroic Ukrainians “bleed Russia dry”; to think of the conflict as a mere sub-plot in Cold War II, a struggle in which China is our real opponent.
The reality of Ukraine as a proxy war is terrifying, especially when combined with quite tenous hopes that Putin will be toppled in a coup.
The second suggestion is an interview with Emma Ashford by Ezra Klein (both as podcast and in transcribed format). It is about foreign policy realism, and no matter the specific policies one ends up supporting I think realism in the sense of acting from the basis of the actual situation we find ourselves in is crucial. This also relates to my third suggestion:
A weekly series of “Letters from Ukraine” published by Endnotes, part 1 and part 2 so far. These interviews combine a snapshot from the war as it unfolds and tries to think through the broader forces of capital and empire that shape the political and social possibilities. It is a testament to the need to think both about the current situation (realism) while sustaining hope for a different world, the possibility for actual change, beyond the current coordinates of economy and politics. Because this is the most difficult and yet important thing at the moment: to not get caught up in only the day to day development of the brutal war. To not react instinctively with escalation of the conflict. But to try and think long term about the future and what actions and what solidarity can build a more peaceful world. Does the military buildup in Europe make us safer? I am skeptical.
On that issue my fourth and final suggestion is an essay in NLR: “Fog of War” by Wolfgang Streeck. He points out that the future uses of the military capabilities of Germany is probably not territorial defence:
Nobody thinks that had Germany actually lived up to the 2 percent NATO demand, Russia would have been deterred from invading Ukraine, or that Germany would have been able and willing to come to its aid. It will also take years for the new hardware, of course the latest on offer, to be made available to the troops. And it will be hardware of exactly the sort that the US, France and the UK already have in abundance.
And not to be forgotten, the entire German military is under the command of NATO, meaning the Pentagon, so the new arms will add to NATO’s, not Germany’s firepower. Technologically, they will be designed for deployment around the globe, on ‘missions’ like Afghanistan – or, most likely, in the environs of China, to assist the US in its emerging confrontation in the South China Sea.
This is, with or without a Swedish NATO membership, probably the destiny for the rebuilt Swedish defence as well. Military capability does not tend to just sit around, but be used sooner or later. And that use is always violent.
Thanks for reading,
Tormod